A foundation for strategic agenda voting
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More about this item
KeywordsStrategic Voting; Agendas; Committees; Institutions; Axioms;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-06-25 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2012-06-25 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-06-25 (Microeconomics)
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