Agendas in Legislative Decision-Making
Despite the wide range of agendas used in legislative decision-making, the literature has focused almost exclusively on two stylized formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. As emphasized by Ordeshook and Schwartz , this focus leaves a sizable gap in our understanding of the legislative process. To help address the deficiency, I first define a very broad class of agendas (called simple agendas) whose features are common among agendas used in legislative settings. I then characterize the sophisticated (Farquharson ) voting outcomes implemented by agendas in this class. By establishing a clear connection between the structure of simple agendas and the outcomes associated with them, the characterization extends our understanding of legislative decision-making well beyond the very limited scope of Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas.
|Date of creation:||2016|
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- Apesteguia, Jose & Ballester, Miguel A. & Masatlioglu, Yusufcan, 2014.
"A foundation for strategic agenda voting,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 91-99.
- Jose Apesteguia & Miguel Ángel Ballester & Yusufcan Masatlioglu, 2012. "A Foundation for Strategic Agenda Voting," Working Papers 607, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Jose Apesteguia & Miguel Ballester & Yusufcan Masatlioglu, 2012. "A foundation for strategic agenda voting," Economics Working Papers 1302, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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- McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
- Ching, Stephen, 1996. "A Simple Characterization of Plurality Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 298-302, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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