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Two-stage majoritarian choice

Author

Listed:
  • Sean Horan

    (Université de Montréal)

  • Yves Sprumont

    (Université de Montréal)

Abstract

We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on an exogenous linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first relation is used to obtain a shortlist of the feasible alternatives while the second is used to make a final choice. In combination with faithfulness to the underlying majority relation, rules in this class are characterized by two desirable rationality properties: Sen’s expansion consistency and a version of Manzini and Mariotti’s weak WARP. The rules also satisfy natural adaptations of Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives and May’s positive responsiveness.

Suggested Citation

  • Sean Horan & Yves Sprumont, 2020. "Two-stage majoritarian choice," Cahiers de recherche 2020-05, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2020-05
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/23365
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Margarita Kirneva & Matias Nunez, 2021. "Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes," Working Papers 2021-08, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    3. Kops, Christopher, 2022. "Cluster-shortlisted choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    4. Juan Lleras & Yusufcan Masatlioglu & Daisuke Nakajima & Erkut Ozbay, 2021. "Path-Independent Consideration," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-10, March.
    5. Felix Brandt & Chris Dong, 2022. "On Locally Rationalizable Social Choice Functions," Papers 2204.05062, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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