A model of cultural transmission, voting and political ideology
In this paper we present a model of cultural transmission of preferences on goods some of which are provided publicly through simple majority voting. We emphasize the existence of a two way causality between socialization decisions and political outcomes. This generales the possibility of indeterminacies and multiple self fulfilling equilibrium paths in cultural change and politics. We provide then a rationale for ideologies and collective socialization institutions as coordination mechanisms allowing cultural groups to preserve or shift political power in favor of their preference profile in the long run.
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- Joel M. Guttman & Shmuel Nitzan & Uriel Spiegel, 1992. "Rent Seeking And Social Investment In Taste Change," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 31-42, 03.
- Paul Krugman, 1991. "History versus Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 651-667.
- Kiminori Matsuyama, 1991.
"Increasing Returns, Industrialization, and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 617-650.
- Kiminori Matsuyama, 1990. "Increasing Returns, Industrialization and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 878, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Congleton, Roger D., 1991. "Ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent-seeking society," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 65-86, February.
- David Austen-Smith, 1987. "Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 123-139, January.
- Roger Congleton, 1986. "Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 249-263, January.
- Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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