Rent Seeking And Social Investment In Taste Change
We study the social allocation of resources to the alteration of preferences. Such taste changes are Pareto-preferred if, according to both the original and the new taste regime, the resource allocation resulting from the taste change constitutes an improvement. According to this criterion, a degree of altruism is in general Pareto-preferred, because it reduces socially wasteful activities, such as lobbying, bargaining and other rent seeking activities designed to increase one agent's expected share of the contested rent. We present a stylized model that captures the role of education in generating altruism and thus reducing the expenditure on rent seeking. Copyright 1992 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 4 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0954-1985|