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The Optimal Size for a Minority

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  • Hillel Rapoport

    () (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University)

  • Avi Weiss

    () (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University)

Abstract

We investigate a setting in which members of a population, bifurcated into a majority and a minority, transact with randomly matched partners. All members are uniformly altruistic, and each transaction can be carried out cooperatively or through a market mechanism, with cooperative transactions saving on transaction costs. Externalities are introduced, whereby cooperation by members of one group and the

Suggested Citation

  • Hillel Rapoport & Avi Weiss, 2001. "The Optimal Size for a Minority," Working Papers 2001-01, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2001-01
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mark Gradstein & Maurice Schiff, 2006. "The political economy of social exclusion, with implications for immigration policy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 327-344, June.
    2. John Smith, 2012. "Reputation, Social Identity and Social Conflict," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(4), pages 677-709, August.
    3. Epstein, Gil S. & Mealem, Yosef, 2010. "Interactions between Local and Migrant Workers at the Workplace," IZA Discussion Papers 5051, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    4. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2009. "Ethnicity, assimilation, and harassment in the labor market," Research in Labor Economics,in: Ethnicity and Labor Market Outcomes, volume 29, pages 67-88 Emerald Publishing Ltd.
    5. Epstein, Gil S & Gang, Ira, 2004. "Ethnic Networks and International Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 4616, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Amin, Mohammad & Mattoo, Aaditya, 2005. "Does temporary migration have to be permanent?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3582, The World Bank.
    7. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N Gang, 2006. "Migrants, Ethnicity and Strategic Assimilation," Departmental Working Papers 200630, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    8. Rapoport, Hillel & Weiss, Avi, 2002. "In-Group Cooperation in a Hostile Environment: An Economic Perspective on Some Aspects of Jewish Life in (Pre-Modern) Diaspora," IZA Discussion Papers 483, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. Michaeli, Moti, 2015. "Group Formation, In-group Bias and the Cost of Cheating," Economics Working Papers MWP2015/04, European University Institute.
    10. Sawchuk, Lawrence A. & Tripp, Lianne & Melnychenko, Ulianna, 2013. "The Jewish Advantage and Household Security: Life Expectancy among 19th Century Sephardim of Gibraltar," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 360-370.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Altruism; Minorities; Ethnic groups; Religious Groups; Relative group size; Social Conflicts;

    JEL classification:

    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers

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