IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

The Political Economy of Social Exclusion with Implications for Immigration Policy

  • Gradstein, Mark

    ()

    (Ben Gurion University)

  • Schiff, Maurice

    ()

    (World Bank)

Minorities, such as ethnic and immigration groups, have often been subject to exclusion through labor market discrimination, residential and employment segregation policies, business ownership regulations, restrictions on political participation, access to public services and more. This paper studies the dynamics of minority exclusion. From the viewpoint of the dominant majority, the exclusion decision balances the motive to redistribute income in its favor and the interest in avoiding potential civic unrest or even violent confrontation with the minority by allowing inclusion of some of its members. The analysis also has implications for immigration policies which have to take this group dynamics into account.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp1087.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1087.

as
in new window

Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Journal of Population Economics, 2006, 19 (2), 327-344
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1087
Contact details of provider: Postal:
IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org

Order Information: Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Klasen, Stephan, 2002. "Social, Economic, and Environmental Limits for the Newly Enfranchised in South Africa," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(3), pages 607-42, April.
  2. William Easterly & Ross Levine, 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1203-1250.
  3. Francesco Caselli & Wilbur John Coleman, 2013. "On the theory of ethnic conflict," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 50242, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  4. Hillel Rapoport & Avi Weiss, 2001. "The Optimal Size for a Minority," Working Papers 2001-01, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
  5. Easterly, William, 2000. "Can institutions resolve ethnic conflict ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2482, The World Bank.
  6. Bertocchi, Graziella & Spagat, Michael, 1999. "The Politics of Cooptation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2156, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 2000. "Greed and grievance in civil war," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2355, The World Bank.
  8. Francesco Caselli, 2007. "On the theory of ethnic conflict," 2007 Meeting Papers 162, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. Bourguignon, Francois & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 285-313, August.
  10. Psacharopoulos, George, 1992. "Ethnicity, education, and earnings in Bolivia and Guatemala," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1014, The World Bank.
  11. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1998. "Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 1797, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September.
  13. Easterly, William, 2000. "the middle class consensus and economic development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2346, The World Bank.
  14. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Curley Effect," NBER Working Papers 8942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser, 1997. "Are Ghettos Good or Bad?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 827-872.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1087. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.