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The Optimal Size for a Minority

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  • Rapoport, Hillel

    (Paris School of Economics)

  • Weiss, Avi

    (Bar-Ilan University)

Abstract

We investigate a setting in which members of a population, bifurcated into a majority and a minority, transact with randomly matched partners. All members are uniformly altruistic, and each transaction can be carried out cooperatively or through a market mechanism, with cooperative transactions saving on transaction costs. Externalities are introduced, whereby cooperation by members of one group and the relative size of that group, affect the incentives to cooperate by members of the other group. Under these conditions, we determine the optimal size of the minority from the minority’s perspective, and consider the conditions under which such a size might be attained. The model provides insights on social conflicts both between groups and within groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Rapoport, Hillel & Weiss, Avi, 2001. "The Optimal Size for a Minority," IZA Discussion Papers 284, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp284
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    Cited by:

    1. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2009. "Ethnicity, assimilation, and harassment in the labor market," Research in Labor Economics, in: Ethnicity and Labor Market Outcomes, pages 67-88, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    2. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N Gang, 2006. "Migrants, Ethnicity and Strategic Assimilation," Departmental Working Papers 200630, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    3. John Smith, 2012. "Reputation, Social Identity and Social Conflict," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(4), pages 677-709, August.
    4. Fabio Mariani, 2013. "The political economy of naturalization," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 46(2), pages 656-688, May.
    5. Mark Gradstein & Maurice Schiff, 2006. "The political economy of social exclusion, with implications for immigration policy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 327-344, June.
    6. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2006. "Ethnic Networks and International Trade," Springer Books, in: Rolf J. Langhammer & Federico Foders (ed.), Labor Mobility and the World Economy, pages 85-103, Springer.
    7. Epstein, Gil S. & Mealem, Yosef, 2010. "Interactions between Local and Migrant Workers at the Workplace," IZA Discussion Papers 5051, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Amin, Mohammad & Mattoo, Aaditya, 2005. "Does temporary migration have to be permanent?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3582, The World Bank.
    9. Rapoport, Hillel & Weiss, Avi, 2002. "In-Group Cooperation in a Hostile Environment: An Economic Perspective on Some Aspects of Jewish Life in (Pre-Modern) Diaspora," IZA Discussion Papers 483, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Michaeli, Moti, 2015. "Group Formation, In-group Bias and the Cost of Cheating," Economics Working Papers MWP2015/04, European University Institute.
    11. Sawchuk, Lawrence A. & Tripp, Lianne & Melnychenko, Ulianna, 2013. "The Jewish Advantage and Household Security: Life Expectancy among 19th Century Sephardim of Gibraltar," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 360-370.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social conflicts; minorities; ethnic groups; religious groups; Altruism; relative group size;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers

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