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Reputation, Social Identity and Social Conflict

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  • JOHN SMITH

Abstract

We interpret the social identity literature and examine its economic implications. We model a population of agents from two exogenous and well defined social groups. Agents are randomly matched to play a reduced form bargaining game. We show that this struggle for resources drives a conflict through the rational destruction of surplus. We assume that the population contains both unbiased and biased players. Biased players aggressively discriminate against members of the other social group. The existence and specification of the biased player is motivated by the social identity literature. For unbiased players, group membership has no payoff relevant consequences. We show that the unbiased players can contribute to the conflict by aggressively discriminating and that this behavior is consistent with existing empirical evidence.
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Suggested Citation

  • John Smith, 2012. "Reputation, Social Identity and Social Conflict," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(4), pages 677-709, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:14:y:2012:i:4:p:677-709
    DOI: j.1467-9779.2012.01557.x
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2012.01557.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nick Drydakis, 2022. "Sexual orientation discrimination in the labor market against gay men," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 1027-1058, September.
    2. Adnan, Wifag & Arin, K. Peren & Charness, Gary & Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco, 2022. "Which social categories matter to people: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 125-145.
    3. Tirole, Jean & Bénabou, Roland, 2007. "Identity, Dignity and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets," CEPR Discussion Papers 6123, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Johnston, David W. & Lordan, Grace, 2016. "Racial prejudice and labour market penalties during economic downturns," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 57-75.
    5. Johnston, David W. & Lordan, Grace, 2014. "When work disappears: racial prejudice and recession labour market penalties," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 56110, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Drydakis, Nick, 2021. "Social Rejection, Family Acceptance, Economic Recession and Physical and Mental Health of Sexual Minorities," GLO Discussion Paper Series 936, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    7. Afridi, Farzana & Li, Sherry Xin & Ren, Yufei, 2015. "Social identity and inequality: The impact of China's hukou system," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 17-29.
    8. Martin Kolmar & Andreas Wagener, 2019. "Group Identities in Conflicts," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 165-192, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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