A model of cultural transmission, voting and political ideology
In this paper we present a model of cultural transmission of preferences on goods some of which are provided publicly through simple majority voting. We emphasize the existence of a two way causality between socialization decisions and political outcomes. This generales the possibility of indeterminacies and multiple self fulfilling equilibrium paths in cultural change and politics. We provide then a rationale for ideologies and collective socialization institutions as coordination mechanisms allowing cultural groups to preserve or shift political power in favor of their preference profile in the long run.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in European Journal of Political Economy, 2000, vol. 16, pp. 5-29.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 48 boulevard Jourdan - 75014 Paris|
Phone: 01 43 13 63 00
Fax: 01 43 13 63 10
Web page: http://www.delta.ens.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
- Paul Krugman, 1991. "History versus Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 651-667.
- Kiminori Matsuyama, 1991.
"Increasing Returns, Industrialization, and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 617-650.
- Kiminori Matsuyama, 1990. "Increasing Returns, Industrialization and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 878, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Joel M. Guttman & Shmuel Nitzan & Uriel Spiegel, 1992. "Rent Seeking And Social Investment In Taste Change," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 31-42, 03.
- David Austen-Smith, 1987. "Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 123-139, January.
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
- Congleton, Roger D., 1991. "Ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent-seeking society," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 65-86, February.
- Roger Congleton, 1986. "Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 249-263, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:del:abcdef:1999-13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.