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Propose or Vote: A simple Democratic Procedure

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  • Hans Gersbach

Abstract

This paper introduces a simple democratic procedure. In a first stage, all members of a polity decide whether to apply for proposal-making or later vote on proposals made in the second stage. This procedure is called Propose or Vote (PoV). With appropriate default points and majority voting over two randomly selected proposals, the PoV procedure can implement the Condorcet winner with only one round of voting if a Condorcet winner exists. We explore ways to establish uniqueness, alternative voting procedures over the selected alternatives, and the application to elections. In the latter case, agents can decide whether to stand for election to an office or to vote on the set of candidates.

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  • Hans Gersbach, 2025. "Propose or Vote: A simple Democratic Procedure," Papers 2506.05998, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2506.05998
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    References listed on IDEAS

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