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Social Choice and Electoral Competition in the General Spatial Model

  • Banks, Jeffrey
  • Duggan, John
  • Le Breton, Michel

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Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 188.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory, vol.�126, n°1, janvier 2006, p.�194-234.
Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:587
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  1. KIRMAN, Alan P. & SONDERMANN, Dieter, . "Arrow's theorem, many agents, and indivisible dictators," CORE Discussion Papers RP -118, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Armstrong, Thomas E., 1980. "Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 55-75, March.
  3. Davis, Otto A & DeGroot, Morris H & Hinich, Melvin J, 1972. "Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(1), pages 147-57, January.
  4. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
  5. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1995. "Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 523-536.
  6. Hartley, Richard & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1987. "The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 175-183, October.
  7. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1977. "On the Continuous Representation of Preorders," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 18(2), pages 509-13, June.
  8. Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman & Nicholas Miller, 1988. "Centripetal forces in spatial voting: On the size of the Yolk," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 37-50, October.
  9. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
  10. Jeffrey S. Banks & John Duggan & Michel LeBreton, . "Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections," Wallis Working Papers WP14, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  11. Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-Francois Laslier, 1999. "Comparison functions and choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 513-532.
  12. Laffond G. & Laslier J. F. & Le Breton M., 1993. "The Bipartisan Set of a Tournament Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 182-201, January.
  13. Josep Enric Peris Ferrando & Begoña Subiza Martínez, 1997. "Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  14. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
  15. Donald G. Saari, 1997. "The generic existence of a core for q -rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 219-260.
  16. Tovey, C.A., 1992. "The Almost Surely Shrinking Yolk," Papers 161, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy.
  17. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
  18. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 511-14, March.
  19. DUGGAN, John & LE BRETON, Michel, 1999. "Mixed refinements of Shapley’s saddles and weak tournaments," CORE Discussion Papers 1999021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  20. Schofield, Norman, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705, October.
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