Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems
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- Roger B. Myerson, 1992. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems," Discussion Papers 1000, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
References listed on IDEAS
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