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Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure


  • Roger B. Myerson


This paper develops an economic perspective on political theory, as a guide to some problems and directions of current research. The electoral system and the allocation of powers to elected offices together define the game that politicians play. So democratic structures should be compared and evaluated by analyzing game models, to see how equilibrium behavior of political agents may depend on the structure of the political system. The goal of such research is to predict how the conduct of politicians and the performance of government may depend on the incentives created by the structure of the political system.

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  • Roger B. Myerson, 1994. "Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure," Discussion Papers 1095, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1095

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Van Damme, Eric & Selten, Reinhard & Winter, Eyal, 1990. "Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 188-201, June.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1181-1206_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:86:y:1992:i:04:p:951-965_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Richard D. Mckelvey & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Seniority in Legislature," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 12, pages 185-199 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. repec:cup:apsrev:v:82:y:1988:i:02:p:405-422_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(02), pages 405-422, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Søberg, Martin, 2003. "Voting rules and endogenous trading institutions: An experimental study," Memorandum 17/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    2. Morten Søberg, 2002. "Voting rules and endogenous trading institutions: An experimental study," Discussion Papers 328, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    3. Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 1998. "The political economy of targeting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 177-200, April.

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