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Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance

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  • Roger B. Myerson

Abstract

This paper develops an economic perspective on political theory as a guide to some problems and directions of current research. The electoral system and the allocation of powers to elected offices together define the game that politicians play. So democratic structures should be compared and evaluated by analyzing game models to see how equilibrium behavior of political agents may depend on the structure of the political system. The goal of such research is to predict how the conduct of politicians and the performance of government may depend on the incentives created by the structure of the political system.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger B. Myerson, 1995. "Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 77-89, Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:77-89
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.77
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.9.1.77
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Myerson, Roger B., 1993. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(4), pages 856-869, December.
    2. Van Damme, Eric & Selten, Reinhard & Winter, Eyal, 1990. "Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 188-201, June.
    3. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    4. Myerson, Roger B. & Weber, Robert J., 1993. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 102-114, March.
    5. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," EPRU Working Paper Series 93-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    6. Richard D. Mckelvey & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Seniority in Legislature," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 12, pages 185-199, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Shugart,Matthew Soberg & Carey,John M., 1992. "Presidents and Assemblies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521429900, Enero-Abr.
    8. Shugart,Matthew Soberg & Carey,John M., 1992. "Presidents and Assemblies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521419628, Enero-Abr.
    9. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 405-422, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    2. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 1998. "Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 149-175, April.
    3. Flavia Poinsot, 2022. "La tragedia de los políticos y los votantes: Cuando el crecimiento económico se convierte en una utopía," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4586, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    4. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier, 2013. "Voting Experiments," PSE Working Papers halshs-04745041, HAL.
    5. Silvia Dominguez-Martinez & Otto Swank, 2006. "Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 527-545, June.
    6. Tridimas, George, 2011. "The political economy of power-sharing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 328-342, June.
    7. Søberg, Martin, 2003. "Voting rules and endogenous trading institutions: An experimental study," Memorandum 17/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    8. Roger B. Myerson, 1996. "Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction," Discussion Papers 1155, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Herrade Igersheim & Antoinette Baujard & Jean-François Laslier, 2016. "La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ," Working Papers halshs-01402275, HAL.
    10. Morten Søberg, 2002. "Voting rules and endogenous trading institutions: An experimental study," Discussion Papers 328, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    11. Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2004. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 51-74, Winter.
    12. Scott E. Page, 2008. "Uncertainty, Difficulty, and Complexity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 115-149, April.
    13. Igerseim, Herrade & Baujard, Antoinette & Laslier, Jean-François, 2016. "La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 92(1-2), pages 151-189, Mars-Juin.
    14. Ossokina, Ioulia V. & Swank, Otto H., 2004. "The optimal degree of polarization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 255-262, March.
    15. Cusack, Thomas R., 1997. "Social capital, institutional structures, and democratic performance: A comparative study of German local governments," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Institutions and Social Change FS III 97-201, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    16. Acemoglu, Daron, 2005. "Politics and economics in weak and strong states," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1199-1226, October.
    17. Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 1998. "The political economy of targeting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 177-200, April.
    18. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
    19. David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1997. "Social Choice Theory," Discussion Papers 1196, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    20. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01136390 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Neugart, Michael, 2005. "Unemployment insurance: The role of electoral systems and regional labour markets," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 815-829, December.
    22. Stephen Ansolabehere & Jonathan Rodden & James M. Snyder Jr., 2006. "Purple America," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 97-118, Spring.
    23. Hortala-Vallve, Rafael & Esteve-Volart, Berta, 2011. "Voter turnout and electoral competition in a multidimensional policy space," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 376-384, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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