Politics and economics in weak and strong states
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- Daron Acemoglu, 2005. "Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States," NBER Working Papers 11275, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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JEL classification:
- P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
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