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Oligarchikus és demokratikus társadalmak
[Oligarchic versus democratic societies]

Author

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  • Acemoglu, Daron

Abstract

E tanulmány egy olyan modellt mutat be, amelynek segítségével elemezni lehet a különböző politikai rendszerek gazdasági teljesítményét. Egy "oligarchikus" társadalom - amelyben a politikai hatalom a főbb termelők kezében van - védi a tulajdonjogokat, azonban jelentős belépési korlátokat állít az új vállalkozók elé. Demokráciában a politikai hatalom széles körben megosztott, a termelőktől származó adóbevételeket újraosztják, de igyekeznek elkerülni a belépési korlátokat. Amikor a demokratikus társadalomban az adóráta magas, és a belépési korlátok okozta torzítások csekélyek, akkor az oligarchikus társadalom a hatékonyabb. Mivel a vállalkozók komparatív előnye idővel csökken, a belépési korlátok okozta torzítás időben növekedni fog. Az oligarchikus társadalmakra a fellendülés, majd a visszaesés jellemző: két, minden más tekintetben egyforma társadalomban először az oligarchikus berendezkedésű lesz gazdagabb, majd lemarad a demokratikus berendezkedésű társadalomhoz képest. A tanulmány ezen túlmenően azt is bemutatja, hogyan képes a demokratikus társadalom jobban kiaknázni az új technológia nyújtotta lehetőségeket, hogyan válhat demokratikussá egy oligarchikus társadalom a vezetőréteg belső konfliktusának következtében, és hogyan konzerválja a jövedelem egyenlőtlen elosztása a meglévő oligarchikus intézményeket, amelyek akkor is fennmaradhatnak, amikor a társadalom számára már tetemes költségekkel járnak. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: P16, O10.

Suggested Citation

  • Acemoglu, Daron, 2008. "Oligarchikus és demokratikus társadalmak [Oligarchic versus democratic societies]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 622-659.
  • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1034
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Juhász, Réka, 2010. "Posztszocialista fejlődési pályák [Post-socialist development paths]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 222-240.

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    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

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