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La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ

Author

Listed:
  • Herrade Igersheim

    () (CNRS, BETA (UMR CNRS 7522), Université de Strasbourg, 61, avenue de la Forêt Noire, 67085 Strasbourg Cedex, France)

  • Antoinette Baujard

    () (Univ Lyon, UJM Saint-Etienne, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-42023 Saint- Etienne, France)

  • Jean-François Laslier

    () (CNRS, Paris School of Economics (UMR CNRS 8545), 48, boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France)

Abstract

Cet article est une revue de la littérature sur les expérimentations de vote qui étudient les comportements des votants et les propriétés des modes de scrutin. Tout d’abord, nous décrivons les expérimentations menées en laboratoire autour de trois aspects principaux : résultats agrégés selon le mode de scrutin, vote stratégique, paradoxe du vote. Nous abordons ensuite les expérimentations In Situ, typiques de l’étude expérimentale du vote, consistant à tester en marge d’élections officielles d’envergure des méthodes de vote alternatives. Nous étudions le protocole expérimental, deux enseignements généraux –l’accueil et les réactions des électeurs– ainsi que deux enseignements spécifiques –la comparaison des résultats agrégés et la description de l’offre politique telle que perçue par les électeurs.

Suggested Citation

  • Herrade Igersheim & Antoinette Baujard & Jean-François Laslier, 2016. "La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ," Working Papers 1633, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
  • Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:1633
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Isabelle Lebon & Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier, 2017. "Ce que le vote par approbation révèle des préférences des électeurs français," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 68(6), pages 1063-1076.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vote; économie expérimentale; expérimentation en laboratoire; expérimentation In Situ; vote stratégique;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

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