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A live experiment on approval voting

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  • Jean-François Laslier
  • Karine Straeten

Abstract

This paper presents a large-scale experiment on the Approval Voting rule that took place during the 2002 French presidential election. We describe the experiment and its main results. The findings are as follows: (i) Such an experiment is feasible, and very well accepted by voters. (ii) The principle of approval voting is easily understood and accepted. (iii) Within the observed political context, compared to the official first-round vote, approval voting modifies the overall ranking of candidates. (iv) The candidates Le Pen and Chirac, more than the others, were able to convert approval votes into official first-round votes. Copyright Economic Science Association 2008

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-François Laslier & Karine Straeten, 2008. "A live experiment on approval voting," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(1), pages 97-105, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:11:y:2008:i:1:p:97-105
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-9149-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:reg:rpubli:259 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004. "Field Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December.
    3. Michel Regenwetter & Ilia Tsetlin, 2004. "Approval voting and positional voting methods: Inference, relationship, examples," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(3), pages 539-566, June.
    4. Guarnaschelli, Serena & McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2000. "An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 407-423, June.
    5. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2010. "Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 19-37, Springer.
    6. Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, 2004. "Prediction Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 107-126, Spring.
    7. Michel L. Balinski & Rida Laraki & Jean-François Laslier & Karine van Der Straeten, 2003. "Le vote par assentiment : une expérience," Working Papers hal-00242959, HAL.
    8. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2001. "A nail-biting election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 409-414.
    9. Laslier, Jean-François, 2006. "Spatial Approval Voting," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 160-185, April.
    10. Regenwetter, Michel, 1997. "Probabilistic preferences and topset voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 91-105, October.
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