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A live experiment on approval voting

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  • Jean-François Laslier

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  • Karine Straeten

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Abstract

This paper presents a large-scale experiment on the Approval Voting rule that took place during the 2002 French presidential election. We describe the experiment and its main results. The findings are as follows: (i) Such an experiment is feasible, and very well accepted by voters. (ii) The principle of approval voting is easily understood and accepted. (iii) Within the observed political context, compared to the official first-round vote, approval voting modifies the overall ranking of candidates. (iv) The candidates Le Pen and Chirac, more than the others, were able to convert approval votes into official first-round votes. Copyright Economic Science Association 2008

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-François Laslier & Karine Straeten, 2008. "A live experiment on approval voting," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(1), pages 97-105, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:11:y:2008:i:1:p:97-105 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-9149-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:reg:rpubli:259 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2001. "A nail-biting election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 409-414.
    3. Laslier, Jean-François, 2006. "Spatial Approval Voting," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(02), pages 160-185, March.
    4. Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004. "Field Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 1009-1055.
    5. Michel Regenwetter & Ilia Tsetlin, 2004. "Approval voting and positional voting methods: Inference, relationship, examples," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(3), pages 539-566, June.
    6. repec:cup:apsrev:v:94:y:2000:i:02:p:407-423_22 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Diego Comin & Mark Gertler, 2006. "Medium-Term Business Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 523-551.
    8. Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, 2004. "Prediction Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, pages 107-126.
    9. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
    10. Regenwetter, Michel, 1997. "Probabilistic preferences and topset voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 91-105, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016. "Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 114-128.
    2. Granić, Đura-Georg, 2017. "The problem of the divided majority: Preference aggregation under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 21-38.
    3. Enriqueta Aragones & Micael Castanheira, 2010. "approval voting," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. Warziniack, Travis, 2010. "Efficiency of public goods provision in space," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(8), pages 1723-1730, June.
    5. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 157-189.
    6. repec:kap:pubcho:v:173:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0472-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:spr:sochwe:v:49:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1052-x is not listed on IDEAS

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