A live experiment on approval voting
This paper presents a large-scale experiment on the Approval Voting rule that took place during the 2002 French presidential election. We describe the experiment and its main results. The findings are as follows: (i) Such an experiment is feasible, and very well accepted by voters. (ii) The principle of approval voting is easily understood and accepted. (iii) Within the observed political context, compared to the official first-round vote, approval voting modifies the overall ranking of candidates. (iv) The candidates Le Pen and Chirac, more than the others, were able to convert approval votes into official first-round votes. Copyright Economic Science Association 2008
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Volume (Year): 11 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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03-025, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005.
"Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting,"
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Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
- Brams, S.J. & Fishburn, P.C., 2003. "Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting," Working Papers 03-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Michel Regenwetter & Ilia Tsetlin, 2004. "Approval voting and positional voting methods: Inference, relationship, examples," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(3), pages 539-566, 06.
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