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Strategic Approval Voting in a large electorate

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  • Jean-François Laslier

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The paper considers approval voting for a large population of voters. It is proven that, based on statistical information about candidate scores, rational voters vote sincerly. It is also proven that if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-François Laslier, 2004. "Strategic Approval Voting in a large electorate," Working Papers hal-00242909, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242909
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00242909
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    10. John Bone, 2003. "Simple Arrow-type propositions in the Edgeworth domain," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(1), pages 41-48.
    11. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki & Jean-François Laslier & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2003. "Le vote par assentiment : une expérience," Working Papers hal-00242959, HAL.
    12. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sébastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes," THEMA Working Papers 2013-31, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    2. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016. "Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
    3. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
    4. Martin Gregor, 2013. "The Optimal Ballot Structure for Double-Member Districts," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp493, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    5. Matías Núñez & Jean Laslier, 2014. "Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 313-340, February.
    6. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, January.
    7. Jorge Gonzalez Suitt & Axel Guyon & Thibault Hennion & Rida Laraki & Xavier Starkloff & Sophie Thibault & Benjamin Favreau, 2014. "Vers un système de vote plus juste ?," Working Papers hal-01061100, HAL.
    8. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2007. "Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 229-245, September.
    9. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2008. "Sincere, strategic, and heuristic voting under four election rules: An experimental study," Working Papers hal-00335046, HAL.

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