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Two Criteria for Social Decisions

Listed author(s):
  • Marc Fleurbaey

    ()

    (Nuffield College, Oxford University, UK)

This paper studies the ethical underpinnings of two social criteria which are prominent in the literature dealing with the problem of evaluating allocations of several consumption goods in a population with heteregenous preferences. The Pazner-Schmeidler criterion (Pazner-Schmeidler 1978) and the Walrasian criterion (Fleurbaey and Maniquet 1996) are prima facie quite different. But it is shown here that these criteria are related to close variants of the fairness condition that an allocation is better when every individual bundle in it dominates the average consumption in another allocation. In addition, the results suggest that the Pazner-Schmeidler criterion can be viewed as the best extension of the Walrasian criterion to non-convex economies.

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File URL: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2004/w27/Twocriteria2.pdf
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Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 2004-W27.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2004
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0427
Contact details of provider: Web page: https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/economics/

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 2000. "Fair Social Orderings With Unequal Production Skills," THEMA Working Papers 2000-17, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  2. Marc Fleurbaey & Kotaro Suzumura & Koichi Tadenuma, 2005. "The informational basis of the theory of fair allocation," Post-Print hal-00247023, HAL.
  3. Tadenuma, Koichi, 1998. "Efficiency First or Equity First?: Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice," Discussion Papers 1998-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  4. Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson, 1990. "A Review Article: The Case against the Use of the Sum of Compensating Variations in Cost-Benefit Analysis," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(3), pages 471-494, August.
  5. MANIQUET, François & SPRUMONT, Yves, "undated". "Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1826, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Marc Fleurbaey, 2005. "Health, wealth and fairness," Post-Print hal-00247025, HAL.
  7. Marc Fleurbaey & Maurice Salles & John Weymark, 2008. "Justice, Political Liberalism and Utilitarianism," Post-Print hal-00246415, HAL.
  8. Marc Fleurbaey & Alain Trannoy, 2003. "The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 243-263, October.
  9. Francois Maniquet, 2002. "Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects," Economics Working Papers 0015, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  10. Thomson, William, 1988. "A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 237-254, December.
  11. FLEURBAEY, Marc & MANIQUET, François, "undated". "Fair income tax," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1845, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-687.
  13. FLEURBAEY, Marc & MANIQUET, François, "undated". "Fair social orderings," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1995, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. MANIQUET, François & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2002. "Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good," Cahiers de recherche 2002-04, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  15. Amartya Sen, 1999. "The Possibility of Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 349-378, June.
  16. Marc Fleurbaey, 2003. "On the informational basis of social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 347-384, October.
  17. Maniquet, Francois, 1999. "A strong incompatibility between efficiency and equity in non-convex economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 467-474, December.
  18. Marc Fleurbaey & Philippe Mongin, 2005. "The news of the death of welfare economics is greatly exaggerated," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 381-418, December.
  19. Koichi Tadenuma, 2005. "Egalitarian-equivalence and the Pareto principle for social preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(3), pages 455-473, 06.
  20. Marc Fleurbaey & Philippe Mongin, 2005. "The news of the death of welfare economics is greatly exaggerated," Post-Print hal-00246986, HAL.
  21. Varian, Hal R., 1974. "Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September.
  22. Samuelson, Paul A, 1977. "Reaffirming the Existence of "Reasonable" Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 44(173), pages 81-88, February.
  23. Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2005. "Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 93-127, 09.
  24. Sprumont, Yves & Zhou, Lin, 1999. "Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 321-339, April.
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