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Two Criteria for Social Decisions

  • Marc Fleurbaey

    ()

    (Nuffield College, Oxford University, UK)

This paper studies the ethical underpinnings of two social criteria which are prominent in the literature dealing with the problem of evaluating allocations of several consumption goods in a population with heteregenous preferences. The Pazner-Schmeidler criterion (Pazner-Schmeidler 1978) and the Walrasian criterion (Fleurbaey and Maniquet 1996) are prima facie quite different. But it is shown here that these criteria are related to close variants of the fairness condition that an allocation is better when every individual bundle in it dominates the average consumption in another allocation. In addition, the results suggest that the Pazner-Schmeidler criterion can be viewed as the best extension of the Walrasian criterion to non-convex economies.

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File URL: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2004/w27/Twocriteria2.pdf
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Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 2004-W27.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0427
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/

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  1. FLEURBAEY, Marc & MANIQUET, François, . "Fair social orderings," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1995, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson, 1990. "A Review Article: The Case against the Use of the Sum of Compensating Variations in Cost-Benefit Analysis," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(3), pages 471-94, August.
  3. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1975. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," Discussion Papers 174, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. H. R. Varian, 1973. "Equity, Envy and Efficiency," Working papers 115, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  5. MANIQUET, François & SPRUMONT, Yves, . "Fair production and allocation of an excludable nonrival good," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1735, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Amartya Sen, 1999. "The Possibility of Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 349-378, June.
  7. Sprumont, Yves & Zhou, Lin, 1999. "Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 321-339, April.
  8. Tadenuma, Koichi, 2002. "Egalitarian-Equivalence and the Pareto Principle for Social Preferences," Discussion Papers 2002-08, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  9. Tadenuma, Koichi, 1998. "Efficiency First or Equity First?: Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice," Discussion Papers 1998-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  10. Marc Fleurbaey, 2003. "On the informational basis of social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 347-384, October.
  11. Francois Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2002. "Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments," Economics Working Papers 0016, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  12. Marc Fleurbaey & Alain Trannoy, 2003. "The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 243-263, October.
  13. Marc Fleurbaey & Philippe Mongin, 2004. "The News of the Death of Welfare Economics is Greatly Exaggerated," Working Papers hal-00242931, HAL.
  14. Maniquet, F., 1996. "A Strong Incompatibility Between Efficiency and Equity in Non-Convex Economics," RCER Working Papers 426, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  15. Marc Fleurbaey & Francois Maniquet, 2002. "Fair Income Tax," Economics Working Papers 0021, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  16. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 2000. "Fair Social Orderings With Unequal Production Skills," THEMA Working Papers 2000-17, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  17. Marc Fleurbaey, 2005. "Health, Wealth, and Fairness," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 253-284, 05.
  18. Marc Fleurbaey & Kotaro Suzumura & Koichi Tadenuma, 2005. "The informational basis of the theory of fair allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 311-341, 04.
  19. MANIQUET, François, . "Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2169, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  20. Thomson, William, 1988. "A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 237-254, December.
  21. Samuelson, Paul A, 1977. "Reaffirming the Existence of "Reasonable" Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 44(173), pages 81-88, February.
  22. FLEURBAEY, Marc & MANIQUET, François, . "Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1805, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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