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Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects

  • Maniquet, François

In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 143 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
Pages: 199-215

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:143:y:2008:i:1:p:199-215
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  2. Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John, 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," IDEI Working Papers 143, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2003.
  3. FLEURBAEY, Marc & MANIQUET, François, . "Help the low skilled or let the hardworking thrive? A study of fairness in optimal income taxation," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1970, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Pazner, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-87, November.
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  8. Tadenuma, Koichi & Thomson, William, 1991. "No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1755-67, November.
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  12. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gevers, Louis, 2002. "Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 459-541 Elsevier.
  13. Marc Fleurbaey, 2001. "The Pazner-Schmeidler Social Ordering: A Defense," Working Papers 328, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  14. Carmen Bevia, 1996. "Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 113-126, January.
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  16. Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-39, July.
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  18. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 1983. "Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 939-54, July.
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