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Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects

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  • MANIQUET, François

Abstract

In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility.
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Suggested Citation

  • MANIQUET, François, 2009. "Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2169, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2169
    Note: In : Journal of Economic Theory, 143, 199-215, 2008
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.02.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2006. "Fair Income Tax," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(1), pages 55-83.
    2. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gevers, Louis, 2002. "Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 459-541 Elsevier.
    3. LeBreton, M., 1994. "Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 94a37, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
    4. Tadenuma, Koichi & Thomson, William, 1991. "No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1755-1767, November.
    5. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 2008. "Fair social orderings," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(1), pages 25-45, January.
    6. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-687.
    7. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 1983. "Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 939-954, July.
    8. Marc Fleurbaey, 2005. "The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(2), pages 145-166, April.
    9. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July.
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    11. Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-1039, July.
    12. Thomson, William, 1990. "On the non existence of envy-free and egalitarian-equivalent allocations in economies with indivisibilities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 227-229, November.
    13. Marc Fleurbaey & Alain Trannoy, 2003. "The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 243-263, October.
    14. Moulin, H & Thomson, W, 1995. "Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation," RCER Working Papers 400, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    15. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 2000. "Fair Social Orderings With Unequal Production Skills," THEMA Working Papers 2000-17, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    16. Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2007. "Help the Low Skilled or Let the Hardworking Thrive? A Study of Fairness in Optimal Income Taxation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 467-500, June.
    17. William Thomson, 2007. "Fair Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 539, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    18. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    19. Alkan, Ahmet, 1994. "Monotonicity and Envyfree Assignments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(4), pages 605-616, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Treibich, Rafael, 2014. "Welfare Egalitarianism with Other-Regarding Preferences," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 22/2014, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Business and Economics.
    2. Maniquet, Francois & Sprumont, Yves, 2005. "Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 155-174, February.
    3. Medernach, Emmanuel & Sanlaville, Eric, 2012. "Fair resource allocation for different scenarios of demands," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 218(2), pages 339-350.
    4. Fleurbaey, Marc, 2007. "Two criteria for social decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 421-447, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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