Fair social orderings
In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.
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| Handle: | RePEc:cor:louvrp:1995 |
| Note: | In : Economic Theory, 34, 25-45, 2008 |
| Contact details of provider: | Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium) Phone: 32(10)474321 Fax: +32 10474304 Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core Email: More information through EDIRC
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- Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & Tadenuma, Koichi, 2005.
"Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 22-44, September.
- Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & Tadenuma, Koichi, 2002. "Arrovian Aggregation in Economic Environments: How Much Should We Know About Indifference Surfaces?," Discussion Paper 121, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & Tadenuma, Koichi, 2002. "Arrovian Aggregation in Economic Environments: How Much Should We Know About Indifference Surfaces?," Discussion Papers 2002-10, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Marc Fleurbaey & Kotaro Suzumura & Koichi Tadenuma, 2005. "Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: How much should we know about indifference surfaces?," Post-Print hal-00246987, HAL.
- Sprumont, Yves & Zhou, Lin, 1999. "Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 321-339, April.
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- Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July.
- Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
- Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Moulin, H & Thomson, W, 1995. "Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation," RCER Working Papers 400, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Marc Fleurbaey & Maurice Salles & John Weymark, 2008. "Justice, Political Liberalism and Utilitarianism," Post-Print hal-00246415, HAL. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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