Fair social orderings
In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.
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|Date of creation:||2008|
|Publication status:||Published in Economic Theory, Springer Verlag, 2008, 34, pp.25-45|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00246525|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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- Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & Tadenuma, Koichi, 2005.
"Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 22-44, September.
- Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & Tadenuma, Koichi, 2002. "Arrovian Aggregation in Economic Environments: How Much Should We Know About Indifference Surfaces?," Discussion Papers 2002-10, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Marc Fleurbaey & Kotaro Suzumura & Koichi Tadenuma, 2005. "Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: How much should we know about indifference surfaces?," Post-Print hal-00246987, HAL.
- Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & Tadenuma, Koichi, 2002. "Arrovian Aggregation in Economic Environments: How Much Should We Know About Indifference Surfaces?," Discussion Paper 121, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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