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Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments

  • MANIQUET, François
  • SPRUMONT, Yves

We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the property that individual welfare levels exceeding a legitimate upper bound should be reduced. Combining that property with efficiency and robustness properties with respect to changes in the set of agents, we obtain a kind of welfare egalitarianism based on a constructed numerical representation of individual preferences.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.004
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number 1826.

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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1826
Note: In : Journal of Economic Theory, 120, 155-174, 2005
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  1. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 2008. "Fair social orderings," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 25-45, January.
  2. Marc Fleurbaey & Maurice Salles & John Weymark, 2008. "Justice, Political Liberalism and Utilitarianism," Post-Print hal-00246415, HAL.
  3. Hervé Moulin, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 305-325.
  4. MANIQUET, François & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2002. "Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good," Cahiers de recherche 2002-04, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  5. Sprumont, Y., 1996. "Equal Factor Equivalence in Economies with Multiple Public Goods," Cahiers de recherche 9627, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  6. Moulin, Herve, 1987. "Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 963-76, July.
  7. Francois Maniquet, 2002. "Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects," Economics Working Papers 0015, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  8. Marc Fleurbaey, 2001. "The Pazner-Schmeidler Social Ordering: A Defense," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 328, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  9. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July.
  10. Claude D'Aspremont & Louis Gevers, 1977. "Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(2), pages 199-209.
  11. Moulin, Herve, 1992. " All Sorry to Disagree: A General Principle for the Provision of Nonrival Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(1), pages 37-51.
  12. LeBreton, M., 1994. "Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 94a37, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
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