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Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments


  • Maniquet, Francois
  • Sprumont, Yves


We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the property that individual welfare levels exceeding a legitimate upper bound should be reduced. Combining that property with efficiency and robustness properties with respect to changes in the set of agents, we obtain a kind of welfare egalitarianism based on a constructed numerical representation of individual preferences.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Maniquet, Francois & Sprumont, Yves, 2005. "Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 155-174, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:120:y:2005:i:2:p:155-174

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. LeBreton, M., 1994. "Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 94a37, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
    2. Maniquet, François, 2008. "Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 199-215, November.
    3. Marcus Fleming, 1952. "A Cardinal Concept of Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 366-384.
    4. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July.
    5. Moulin, Herve, 1987. "Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 963-976, July.
    6. Claude D'Aspremont & Louis Gevers, 1977. "Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(2), pages 199-209.
    7. Moulin, Herve, 1992. " All Sorry to Disagree: A General Principle for the Provision of Nonrival Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(1), pages 37-51.
    8. François Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2004. "Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 627-640, March.
    9. Moulin, Herve, 1990. "Uniform externalities : Two axioms for fair allocation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 305-326, December.
    10. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 2008. "Fair social orderings," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(1), pages 25-45, January.
    11. Marc Fleurbaey, 2005. "The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(2), pages 145-166, April.
    12. Yves Sprumont, 1998. "Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(4), pages 543-558.
    13. Hervé Moulin, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 305-325.
    14. Marc Fleurbaey & Maurice Salles & John Weymark, 2008. "Justice, Political Liberalism and Utilitarianism," Post-Print hal-00246415, HAL.
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    Cited by:

    1. Treibich, Rafael, 2014. "Welfare Egalitarianism with Other-Regarding Preferences," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 22/2014, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Business and Economics.
    2. Efthymios Athanasiou, 2012. "Endogenous productivity and equality of opportunity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(1), pages 59-89, June.
    3. Maniquet, François & Sprumont, Yves, 2010. "Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 275-302, January.
    4. Giacomo, VALETTA, 2007. "A fair solution to the compensation problem," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007038, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
    5. SPRUMONT, Yves, 2009. "Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria," Cahiers de recherche 2009-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    6. Paolo Giovanni Piacquadio, 2017. "A Fairness Justification of Utilitarianism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 1261-1276, July.
    7. Fleurbaey, Marc, 2006. "Is commodity taxation unfair?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 1765-1787, November.
    8. Aitor Calo-Blanco, 2015. "Health, responsibility and taxation with a fresh start," Working Papers 15.06, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    9. Welch, Timothy F., 2013. "Equity in transport: The distribution of transit access and connectivity among affordable housing units," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 283-293.
    10. Aitor Calo-Blanco, 2014. "Fairness, freedom, and forgiveness in health care," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 141-151, June.
    11. Giacomo Valletta, 2009. "A fair solution to the compensation problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 455-478, March.
    12. Fleurbaey, Marc, 2007. "Two criteria for social decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 421-447, May.
    13. Marc Fleurbaey, "undated". "Willingness-to-pay and the Equivalent Approach," OPHI Working Papers ophiwp025, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations


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