Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments
We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the property that individual welfare levels exceeding a legitimate upper bound should be reduced. Combining that property with efficiency and robustness properties with respect to changes in the set of agents, we obtain a kind of welfare egalitarianism based on a constructed numerical representation of individual preferences.
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