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Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments

  • Maniquet, Francois
  • Sprumont, Yves

We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the property that individual welfare levels exceeding a legitimate upper bound should be reduced. Combining that property with efficiency and robustness properties with respect to changes in the set of agents, we obtain a kind of welfare egalitarianism based on a constructed numerical representation of individual preferences.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 120 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 155-174

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:120:y:2005:i:2:p:155-174
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Marc Fleurbaey & Maurice Salles & John Weymark, 2008. "Justice, Political Liberalism and Utilitarianism," Post-Print hal-00246415, HAL.
  2. Moulin, Herve, 1992. " All Sorry to Disagree: A General Principle for the Provision of Nonrival Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(1), pages 37-51.
  3. MANIQUET, François, . "Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2169, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Marc Fleurbaey, 2005. "The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense," Post-Print hal-00247024, HAL.
  5. MANIQUET, François & SPRUMONT, Yves, . "Fair production and allocation of an excludable nonrival good," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1735, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Hervé Moulin, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 305-325.
  7. Sprumont, Y., 1996. "Equal Factor Equivalence in Economies with Multiple Public Goods," Cahiers de recherche 9627, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  8. FLEURBAEY, Marc & MANIQUET, François, . "Fair social orderings," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1995, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July.
  10. Moulin, Herve, 1987. "Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 963-76, July.
  11. Claude D'Aspremont & Louis Gevers, 1977. "Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(2), pages 199-209.
  12. LeBreton, M., 1994. "Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 94a37, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
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