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Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good

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  • François Maniquet
  • Yves Sprumont

Abstract

We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.

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  • François Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2004. "Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 627-640, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:72:y:2004:i:2:p:627-640
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    2. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gevers, Louis, 2002. "Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 459-541, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2008. "Equal sacrifice and fair burden-sharing in a public goods economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(4), pages 415-429, August.
    2. Rafael Treibich, 2019. "Welfare egalitarianism with other-regarding preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(1), pages 1-28, January.
    3. Maniquet, François & Sprumont, Yves, 2010. "Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 275-302, January.
    4. Marc Fleurbaey & Yves Sprumont, 2009. "Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 1-8, February.
    5. Giacomo, VALETTA, 2007. "A fair solution to the compensation problem," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007038, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
    6. Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2006. "Fair Income Tax," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(1), pages 55-83.
    7. FLEURBAEY, Marc & LEROUX, Marie - Louise & PONTHIERE, Gregory, 2010. "Compensating the dead? Yes we can!," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2010066, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. Maniquet, Francois & Sprumont, Yves, 2005. "Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 155-174, February.
    9. Fleurbaey, Marc & Leroux, Marie-Louise & Ponthiere, Gregory, 2014. "Compensating the dead," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 28-41.
    10. SPRUMONT, Yves, 2009. "Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria," Cahiers de recherche 2009-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    11. Marc Fleurbaey & Erik Schokkaert & Koen Decancq, 2008. "What Good is Happiness?," OPHI Working Papers 20, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.
    12. M. Fleurbaey., 2012. "Beyond GDP: The Quest for a Measure of Social Welfare," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 3.
    13. Paolo Giovanni Piacquadio, 2017. "A Fairness Justification of Utilitarianism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 1261-1276, July.
    14. Marc Fleurbaey & Guillaume Gaulier, 2009. "International Comparisons of Living Standards by Equivalent Incomes," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 111(3), pages 597-624, September.
    15. Fleurbaey, Marc, 2006. "Is commodity taxation unfair?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 1765-1787, November.
    16. Giacomo Valletta, 2009. "A fair solution to the compensation problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 455-478, March.
    17. MANIQUET, François, 2014. "Social ordering functions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014051, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    18. Marc Fleurbaey, 2003. "Social Welfare, Priority to the Worst-Off And the Dimensions of Individual Well-Being," IDEP Working Papers 0312, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
    19. Rajat Deb & Tae Seo, 2010. "Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 223-236, March.
    20. MANIQUET, François & NEUMANN, Dirk, 2016. "Well-Being, Poverty and Labor Income Taxation: Theory and Application to Europe and the U.S," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2016029, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    21. Fleurbaey, Marc, 2007. "Two criteria for social decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 421-447, May.
    22. Marc Fleurbaey, 2008. "Willingness-to-pay and the Equivalent Approach," OPHI Working Papers 25, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.

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