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Strategic approval voting in a large electorate

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-François Laslier

    (PREG-CRG - Pole de Recherche en Economie et Gestion - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The paper considers approval voting for a large population of voters.It is proven that, based on statistical information about candidatescores, rational voters vote sincerly and according to a simple behavioralrule. It is also proven that if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidateis elected.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Strategic approval voting in a large electorate," Working Papers halshs-00121751, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00121751
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00121751v1
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    Cited by:

    1. Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoit M., 2012. "Choix social et partage équitable : Une analyse mathématique a posteriori des élections législatives et présidentielles de 2006 et 2011 en RDC [Social choice and fair sharing: An a posteriori mathematical analysis of legislative and presidential e," MPRA Paper 64915, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Sébastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes," Thema Working Papers 2013-31, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS.
    3. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016. "Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
    4. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016. "Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
    5. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "The Leader Rule," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(1), pages 113-136, January.
    6. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
    7. Jorge Gonzalez Suitt & Axel Guyon & Thibault Hennion & Rida Laraki & Xavier Starkloff & Sophie Thibault & Benjamin Favreau, 2014. "Vers un système de vote plus juste ?," Working Papers hal-01061100, HAL.
    8. Nicolas Houy, 2007. "Endogenously Weighted Voting," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(6), pages 1079-1102, December.
    9. Martin Gregor, 2013. "The Optimal Ballot Structure for Double-Member Districts," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp493, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    10. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2007. "Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 229-245, September.
    11. Matías Núñez & Jean Laslier, 2014. "Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 313-340, February.
    12. Matias Nunez & Laslier Jean François Author-Workplace-Name : Ecole Polytechnique, 2010. "Overstating: A tale of two cities," Thema Working Papers 2010-05, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS.
    13. Ulle Endriss, 2013. "Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 335-355, March.
    14. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & Karine van Der Straeten, 2008. "Sincere, strategic, and heuristic voting under four election rules: An experimental study," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) hal-00335046, HAL.
    15. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, January.
    16. François Maniquet & Massimo Morelli, 2015. "Approval quorums dominate participation quorums," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 1-27, June.

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