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Preference Intensity Representation : Strategic Overstating in Large Elections

  • Matias Nunez

    ()

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS : UMR8184 - Université de Cergy Pontoise)

  • Jean-Francois Laslier

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. We give a sufficient condition for strategic equivalence: if two rules share the same set of extremal ballots (up to an homothetic transformation), they are strategically equivalent in large elections. This condition is also necessary for the strategic equivalence of positional rules. These results do not hold for small electorates.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00917099.

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Date of creation: Feb 2013
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Publication status: Published, Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, 0176-1714
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00917099
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00917099
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