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Bargaining through Approval

Listed author(s):
  • Matias Nunez

    ()

    (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA)

  • Jean-Francois Laslier

    (CNRS- Paris School of Economics)

The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their average and median utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game.

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File URL: http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2014-06.pdf
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Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2014-06.

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Date of creation: 2014
Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2014-06
Contact details of provider: Postal:
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  1. Marco Mariotti, 1998. "Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 413-421.
  2. Ulle Endriss, 2013. "Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 335-355, March.
  3. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization," CCES Discussion Paper Series 49, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  4. Ahn, David S & Oliveros, Santiago, 2013. "Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values," Economics Discussion Papers 8983, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  5. Nejat Anbarci, 2006. "Finite Alternating-Move Arbitration Schemes and the Equal Area Solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 21-50, 08.
  6. Sébastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes," THEMA Working Papers 2013-31, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  7. Börgers, Tilman & Postl, Peter, 2009. "Efficient compromising," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2057-2076, September.
  8. Makoto Tanaka & Ryo-ichi Nagahisa, 2002. "An axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution when the feasible sets can be finite," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 751-761.
  9. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2015. "Balancing the Power to Appoint Officers," Working Papers 696, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  10. Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier, 2012. "Implementation with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
  11. Roger B. Myerson, 2000. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0686, Econometric Society.
  12. Francesco De Sinopoli, 2000. "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(4), pages 655-672.
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  14. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-405, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  15. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
  16. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  17. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2008. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Working Papers ECARES 2008-017, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  18. repec:ulb:ulbeco:2013/162238 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Kelly, Jerry S, 1977. "Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 439-446, March.
  20. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2004. "On the rule of K names," Working Papers 264, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  21. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "The Leader rule: a model of strategic approval voting in a large electorate," Post-Print hal-00363218, HAL.
  22. Donald Wittman, 1986. "Final-Offer Arbitration," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(12), pages 1551-1561, December.
  23. GOERTZ, Johanna M.M. & MANIQUET, François, "undated". "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2326, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  24. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2009. "Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 7414, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Geoffroy de Clippel & Kfir Eliaz & Brian Knight, 2014. "On the Selection of Arbitrators," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3434-3458, November.
  26. Dhillon, A. & Lockwood, B., 1999. "When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 549, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  27. Pazner, Elisha A., 1977. "Pitfalls in the theory of fairness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 458-466, April.
  28. Özgür Kıbrıs & Murat Sertel, 2007. "Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(3), pages 421-437, April.
  29. Burak Can & Bora Erdamar & M. Sanver, 2009. "Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 123-144, August.
  30. Jean-François Laslier & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "An Incentive-Compatible Condorcet Jury Theorem," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(1), pages 84-108, 01.
  31. John Conley & Simon Wilkie, 2012. "The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 23-42, January.
  32. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
  33. Francesco Sinopoli & Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Approval voting: three examples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 27-38, December.
  34. Hurwicz, Leonid & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1447-1474, November.
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