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On the Selection of Arbitrators

Author

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  • Geoffroy de Clippel
  • Kfir Eliaz
  • Brian Knight

Abstract

A key feature of arbitration is the possibility for con icting parties to participate in the selection of the arbitrator, the individual who will rule the case. We analyze this problem of the selection of arbitrators from the perspective of implementation theory. In particular, theoretical analyses document problems with veto-rank, a simultaneous procedure that is commonly used in practice, and develop a new sequential procedure, shortlisting, with better properties. Experimental results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, highlighting both the disadvantages associated with the veto-rank procedure and the advantages associated with the short-lising procedure.

Suggested Citation

  • Geoffroy de Clippel & Kfir Eliaz & Brian Knight, 2014. "On the Selection of Arbitrators," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3434-3458, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:11:p:3434-58 Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.11.3434
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Barberà, Salvador & Coelho, Danilo, 2017. "Balancing the power to appoint officers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 189-203.
    2. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
    3. Postl, Peter, 2013. "A ‘divide and choose’ approach to compromising," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 204-209.
    4. Francis X. Flanagan, 2015. "Peremptory Challenges and Jury Selection," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(2), pages 385-416.
    5. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2015. "Strategic disclosure of feasible options," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 145-165.
    6. repec:eee:mateco:v:73:y:2017:i:c:p:111-121 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Camerer, Colin & Dreber, Anna & Forsell, Eskil & Ho, Teck-Hua & Huber, Jurgen & Johannesson, Magnus & Kirchler, Michael & Almenberg, Johan & Altmejd, Adam & Chan, Taizan & Heikensten, Emma & Holzmeist, 2016. "Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in Economics," MPRA Paper 75461, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Martin Van der linden, 2016. "Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoes," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00018, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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