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On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked

Listed author(s):
  • Fehr, Ernst
  • Schmidt, Klaus M.

In this paper we reply to Binmore and Shaked's criticism of the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion. We put the theory and their arguments into perspective and show that their criticism is not substantiated. Finally, we briefly comment on the main challenges for future research on social preferences.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-2681(09)00284-4
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 73 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 101-108

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:73:y:2010:i:1:p:101-108
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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