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Compromising on Compromise Rules

Author

Listed:
  • Salvador Barberà
  • Danilo Coelho

Abstract

We propose three mechanisms to reach compromise between two opposing par- ties. They are based on the use of Rules of k Names, whereby one of the parties proposes a shortlist and the other chooses from it. Methods of this class are used in practice to appoint Supreme Court justices and have been recently proposed for arbitration selection processes. Our mechanisms are flexible and allow the parties to participate in the endogenous determination of the role of proposer and the shortlist size. They involve few stages, weakly implement the Unanimity Compromise Set and are robust to the strategic inclusion of candidates.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2021. "Compromising on Compromise Rules," Working Papers 1263, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1263
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
    2. Matías Núñez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 421-441, February.
    3. Leonid Hurwicz & Murat R. Sertel, 1999. "Designing Mechanisms, in Particular for Electoral Systems: The Majoritarian Compromise," International Economic Association Series, in: Murat R. Sertel (ed.), Contemporary Economic Issues, chapter 4, pages 69-88, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    5. Geoffroy de Clippel & Kfir Eliaz & Brian Knight, 2014. "On the Selection of Arbitrators," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3434-3458, November.
    6. , & ,, 2012. "Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(1), January.
    7. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2008. "How to choose a non-controversial list with k names," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 79-96, June.
    8. Hurwicz, Leonid & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1447-1474, November.
    9. Moulin, Herve, 1981. "Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 398-412, June.
    10. Barberà, Salvador & Coelho, Danilo, 2010. "On the rule of k names," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 44-61, September.
    11. Barberà, Salvador & Coelho, Danilo, 2017. "Balancing the power to appoint officers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 189-203.
    12. Özgür Kıbrıs & Murat Sertel, 2007. "Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(3), pages 421-437, April.
    13. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01310223 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Nejat Anbarci, 1993. "Noncooperative Foundations of the Area Monotonic Solution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(1), pages 245-258.
    15. Nejat Anbarci, 2006. "Finite Alternating-Move Arbitration Schemes and the Equal Area Solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 21-50, August.
    16. Shavell, Steven, 1995. "Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 1-28, January.
    17. Matias Nunez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules," Post-Print hal-03341697, HAL.
    18. Bloom, David E & Cavanagh, Christopher L, 1986. "An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 408-422, June.
    19. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2018. "On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of k names," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 14(1), pages 51-60, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Damien Bol & Jean-François Laslier & Matías Núñez, 2022. "Two Person Bargaining Mechanisms: A Laboratory Experiment," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(6), pages 1145-1177, December.
    2. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2024. "Mechanisms to Appoint Arbitrator Panels or Sets of Judges by Compromise Between Concerned Parties," Working Papers 1442, Barcelona School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    The Unanimity Compromise Set; Compromise Rule of k Names; shortlisting contest; alternate shortlists; shortlisting; voting by alternating offers; and vetoes and fallback bargaining;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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