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Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoes

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  • Martin Van der linden

    () (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

Abstract

Many mechanisms used to select a committee of k members out of a candidates endow voters with some veto power over candidates. Impossibility results are provided showing that, in most cases, even limited veto power implies that the mechanism is not strategy-proof. These impossibilities hold on a large set of domains including the domain of additive preferences and even when probabilistic mechanisms are allowed.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Van der linden, 2016. "Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoes," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00018, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:vuecon-16-00018
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism design; Strategy-proofness; Veto; Probabilistic mechanism; Committee selection;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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