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A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model

  • Kentaro Hatsumi
  • Dolors Berga
  • Shigehiro Serizawa

Following Barbera, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy-proofness and no-vetoer.

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File URL: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2011/DP0809R.pdf
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Paper provided by Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University in its series ISER Discussion Paper with number 0809.

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Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision: Feb 2013
Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0809
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  1. Serizawa Shigehiro, 1995. "Power of Voters and Domain of Preferences Where Voting by Committees Is Strategy-Proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 599-608, December.
  2. Dolors Berga, 2002. "Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 175-192.
  3. Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2003. "On exiting after voting," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 30(2 Year 20), pages 261-288, December.
  4. Kentaro Hatsumi & Dolors Berga & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2011. "A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model," ISER Discussion Paper 0809, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Feb 2013.
  5. Nehring, Klaus & Puppe, Clemens, 2007. "The structure of strategy-proof social choice -- Part I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 269-305, July.
  6. Alejandro Neme & Jordi MassÔ & Salvador BarberÁ, 1999. "Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 321-336.
  7. Ken-Ichi Shimomura, 1996. "Partially efficient voting by committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 327-342.
  8. Hideyuki Mizobuchi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2005. "Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies," ISER Discussion Paper 0628, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  9. Barbera, S. & Gul, F. & Stacchetti, E., 1992. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 184.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  10. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  11. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
  12. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  13. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 298-317, August.
  14. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
  15. Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "Scoring Rules on Dichotomous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 617.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  16. Ching, Stephen & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 1998. "A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 157-166, January.
  17. Berga, D & Serizawa, S, 1996. "Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with one Public Good," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 353.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  18. Dolors Berga & Gustavo Berganti?s & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro Neme, 2002. "Voting by Committees with Exit," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 511.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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