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On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation

Author

Listed:
  • Agustín G. Bonifacio

    (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis, Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET, San Luis, Argentina)

  • Federico Fioravanti

    (Université Jean Monnet Saint-Étienne, CNRS, Université Lyon 2, emlyon business school, GATE, 42023, Saint-Étienne, France)

Abstract

We consider voting rules in settings where voters’ identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identities or abstaining from voting. Immunities to such manipulations are called false-name-proofness and participation, respectively. For the universal domain of (strict) preferences, these properties together imply anonymity and are incompatible with neutrality. For the domain of preferences defined over all subsets of a given set of objects, both of these properties cannot be met by onto and object neutral rules that also satisfy the tops-only criterion. However, when preferences over subsets of objects are restricted to be separable, all these properties can be satisfied. Furthermore, the domain of separable preferences is maximal for these properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Agustín G. Bonifacio & Federico Fioravanti, 2025. "On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation," Working Papers 2509, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
  • Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:2509
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2001. "Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 367-387, November.
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    6. Federico Fioravanti & Jordi Massó, 2024. "False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(2), pages 391-408, September.
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    8. Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Pablo, 2023. "Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: Local and weakly single-peaked domains," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    false-name-proofness; participation; voting; tops-only; anonymity; neutrality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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