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Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem

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  • Masso, Jordi
  • Neme, Alejandro

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  • Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2001. "Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 367-387, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:2:p:367-387
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    1. Thomson, William, 1995. "Population-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 229-246, March.
    2. Alejandro Neme & Jordi MassÔ & Salvador BarberÁ, 1999. "Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(2), pages 321-336.
    3. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-519, March.
    4. Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August.
    5. Berga, Dolors & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2000. "Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 39-61, January.
    6. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
    7. John A. Weymark, 1999. "Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule when all single-peaked preferences are admissible," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(4), pages 389-393.
    8. Thomson, William, 1997. "The Replacement Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 145-168, September.
    9. Schummer, James & Thomson, William, 1997. "Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 333-337, September.
    10. Serizawa Shigehiro, 1995. "Power of Voters and Domain of Preferences Where Voting by Committees Is Strategy-Proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 599-608, December.
    11. Ching, Stephen, 1992. "A simple characterization of the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 57-60, September.
    12. Ching, Stephen & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 1998. "A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 157-166, January.
    13. Yves Sprumont, 1995. "Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 68-107, February.
    14. Berga, Dolors, 1998. "Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 105-120, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2016. "Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 633-663, October.
    2. Hideyuki Mizobuchi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2006. "Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 195-210, August.
    3. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2016. "Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(4), pages 1073-1099, April.
    4. Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Pablo, 2023. "Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: Local and weakly single-peaked domains," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    5. Toyotaka Sakai & Takuma Wakayama, 2012. "Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(3), pages 287-301, March.
    6. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustin G. Bonifacio, 2023. "Not obviously manipulable allotment rules," Papers 2309.06546, arXiv.org.
    7. William Thomson, 2010. "Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(1), pages 1-15, March.
    8. Bochet, O.L.A. & Storcken, A.J.A., 2006. "Maximal domains for strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic choice rules," Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    9. Kentaro Hatsumi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2009. "Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 423-447, September.
    10. Bonifacio Agustín Germán & Arribillaga Roberto Pablo, 2023. "Not obviously manipulable allotment rules," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4627, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    11. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2014. "Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation," Working Papers 773, Barcelona School of Economics.

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