Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
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Volume (Year): 33 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Hideyuki Mizobuchi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2006.
"Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 195-210, August.
- Hideyuki Mizobuchi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2005. "Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies," ISER Discussion Paper 0628, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Eric Maskin, 1998.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Ching, Stephen & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 1998. "A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 157-166, January.
- Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: firstname.lastname@example.org & Alejandro Neme, 2003.
"Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
571.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003.
"Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 249-268, October.
- Ehlers, L. & Klaus, B., 2001. "Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2001-27, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2001. "Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2001-27, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Salvador Barbera, 1995.
"Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules,"
1142, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jordi MassóAuthor-Name: Alejandro Neme, .
"Maximal Domain Of Preferences In The Division Problem,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
434.99, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2001. "Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 367-387, November.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:8:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
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