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Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains

Author

Listed:
  • Agustín Bonifacio

    (Universidad Nacional de San Luis/CONICET)

  • Jordi Massó

    (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona/BSE)

  • Pablo Neme

    (Universidad Nacional de San Luis/CONICET)

Abstract

We show that if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, anonymous and tops-only, then the preferences in its domain have to be local and weakly single-peaked, relative to a family of partial orders obtained from the rule by confronting at most three alternatives with distinct levels of support. Moreover, if this domain is enlarged by adding a non local and weakly single-peaked preference, then the rule becomes manipulable. We finally show that local and weak single-peakedness constitutes a weakening of known and well-studied restricted domains of preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Agustín Bonifacio & Jordi Massó & Pablo Neme, 2022. "Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains," Working Papers 121, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:121
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    File URL: https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/121.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    : Single-peakedness; Strategy-proofness; Anonymity; Unanimity; Tops-onlyness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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