Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.
Volume (Year): 16 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: 28 April 1997/Accepted: 30 January 1998|
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