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Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes


  • Alejandro Neme

    (Instituto de MatemÂtica Aplicada, Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET, EjÊrcito de los Andes 950, 5700 San Luis, Argentina)

  • Jordi MassÔ

    (Departament d'Economia i d'HistÔria EconÔmica and CODE, Universitat AutÔnoma de Barcelona, E-08193 Bellaterra , Spain)

  • Salvador BarberÁ

    (Departament d'Economia i d'HistÔria EconÔmica and CODE, Universitat AutÔnoma de Barcelona, E-08193 Bellaterra , Spain)


We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.

Suggested Citation

  • Alejandro Neme & Jordi MassÔ & Salvador BarberÁ, 1999. "Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(2), pages 321-336.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:2:p:321-336
    Note: Received: 28 April 1997/Accepted: 30 January 1998

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kentaro Hatsumi & Dolors Berga & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2014. "A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 153-168, February.
    2. Alejandro Saporiti & Fernando Tohmé, 2006. "Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 363-383, April.
    3. Alejandro Saporiti & Fernando Tohmé, 2001. "Order-restricted preferences and strategy-proof social choices rules," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 191, Universidad del CEMA.
    4. Bochet Olivier & Storcken Ton, 2006. "Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules," Research Memorandum 002, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    5. Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2001. "Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 367-387, November.
    6. Achuthankutty, Gopakumar & Roy, Souvik, 2017. "On Single-peaked Domains and Min-max Rules," MPRA Paper 81375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Chatterji, Shurojit & Sanver, Remzi & Sen, Arunava, 2013. "On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1050-1073.
    8. Shuhei Morimoto, 2013. "Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(3), pages 637-669, September.

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