On Single-peaked Domains and Min-max Rules
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Puppe, Clemens, 2018.
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More about this item
KeywordsStrategy-proofness; single-peaked preferences; min-max rules; min-max domains; top-connectedness; Pareto property; tops-onlyness.;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-09-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-DES-2017-09-17 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2017-09-17 (Microeconomics)
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