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A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules

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  • Roy, Souvik
  • Sadhukhan, Soumyarup

Abstract

We show that a large class of restricted domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, single-dipped, tree-single-peaked with top-set along a path, Euclidean, multi-peaked, intermediate (Grandmont (1978)), etc., can be characterized by using betweenness property, and we present a unified characterization of unanimous and strategy-proof random rules on these domains. As corollaries of our result, we show that all the domains we consider in this paper satisfy tops-onlyness and deterministic extreme point property. Finally, we consider weak preferences and provide a class of unanimous and strategy-proof random rules on those domains.

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  • Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2021. "A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:197:y:2021:i:c:s0022053120301241
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105131
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    Cited by:

    1. Karmokar, Madhuparna & Roy, Souvik, 2020. "The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules," MPRA Paper 103494, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2022. "On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Betweenness property; Generalized intermediate domains; Random social choice functions; Strategy-proofness; Tops-restricted random min-max rules;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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