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Determining the mix of public and private provision of insurance by majority rule

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  • Anderberg, Dan

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  • Anderberg, Dan, 1999. "Determining the mix of public and private provision of insurance by majority rule," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 417-440, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:417-440
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    2. Gerhard Glomm & B. Ravikumar, 1998. "Opting out of publicly provided services: A majority voting result," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(2), pages 187-199.
    3. Blomquist, Soren & Christiansen, Vidar, 1999. "The political economy of publicly provided private goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 31-54, July.
    4. Barr, Nicholas, 1992. "Economic Theory and the Welfare State: A Survey and Interpretation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 741-803, June.
    5. Karl Ove Moene & Michael Wallerstein, "undated". "Political Support for Targeted versus Universalistic Welfare Policies," IPR working papers 97-2, Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University.
    6. Barr, Nicholas, 1992. "Economic theory and the welfare state : a survey and interpretation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 279, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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    8. Diamond, P. A., 1977. "A framework for social security analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 275-298, December.
    9. Colin Rose, 1993. "Equilibrium and Adverse Selection," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 559-569, Winter.
    10. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    11. Gouveia, Miguel, 1997. "Majority Rule and the Public Provision of a Private Good," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 221-244, December.
    12. Gerald H. Kramer & Alvin K. Klevorick, 1974. "Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(4), pages 539-547.
    13. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1996. "Public Provision of Private Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 57-84, February.
    14. Breyer, Friedrich, 1995. "The Political Economy of Rationing in Social Health Insurance," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 8(2), pages 137-148, May.
    15. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E., 1996. "Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 297-325, November.
    16. CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1998. "On the political sustainability of redistributive social insurance systems," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Cited by:

    1. Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2021. "A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    2. Dennis Epple & Richard Romano, 2003. "Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(2), pages 545-572, May.
    3. Hindriks, Jean & De Donder, Philippe, 2003. "The politics of redistributive social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2639-2660, December.
    4. Wagener, Andreas, 2004. "On intergenerational risk sharing within social security schemes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 181-206, March.
    5. Silvia Platoni, 2010. "Asymmetric Information and Annuities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 501-532, June.
    6. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "Political sustainability and the design of social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 341-364, March.
    7. Achuthankutty, Gopakumar & Roy, Souvik, 2017. "Strategy-proof Rules on Partially Single-peaked Domains," MPRA Paper 82267, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Roger D. Congleton & Alberto Batinti & Rinaldo Pietratonio, 2017. "The Electoral Politics and the Evolution of Complex Healthcare Systems," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 483-510, November.
    9. Balestrino, Alessandro, 1999. "User Charges as Redistributive Devices," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(4), pages 511-524.
    10. Hindriks, Jean & De Donder, Philippe, 2003. "The politics of redistributive social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2639-2660, December.

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