Political Support for Targeted versus Universalistic Welfare Policies
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Other versions of this item:
- Karl Ove Moene & Michael Wallerstein, "undated". "Political Support for Targeted versus Universalistic Welfare Policies," IPR working papers 97-2, Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University.
References listed on IDEAS
- Dewatripont, Mathias, 1987.
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- Mathias Dewatripont, 1987. "The role of indifference in sequential models of spatial competition: an example," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9567, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Edward C. Prescott & Michael Visscher, 1977. "Sequential Location among Firms with Foresight," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 378-393, Autumn.
- Spagat, Michael, 1992. "Validated equilibrium and sequential spatial competition games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 49-57, August.
- Nilssen, T. & Sorgard, L., 1996. "Strategic Location with Asymmetric Transportation Costs," Memorandum 35/1996, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Cancian, Maria & Bills, Angela & Bergstrom, Theodore, 1995. "Hotelling Location Problems with Directional Constraints: An Application to Television News Scheduling," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 121-124, March.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Karl Ove Moene & Michael Wallerstein, 2001. "Targeting and political support for welfare spending," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 3-24, March.
- Anderberg, Dan, 1999. "Determining the mix of public and private provision of insurance by majority rule," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 417-440, September.
More about this item
KeywordsSOCIAL WELFARE ; VOTING ; SOCIAL POLICY;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
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