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Public Provision of Private Goods

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  • Epple, Dennis
  • Romano, Richard E

Abstract

Government may provide a good that can, if legally permitted, be supplemented by private purchases. Policy is determined by majority rule. Under standard assumptions on preferences, a majority voting equilibrium exists. A regime of positive government provision with no restriction on private supplements is shown to be majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision. Combined public and private expenditure on the good is higher under this dual-provision regime than under either of the alternatives. Under some preference configurations, the median-income voter is pivotal; under others, a voter with income below the median is pivotal. Copyright 1996 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1996. "Public Provision of Private Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 57-84, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:104:y:1996:i:1:p:57-84
    DOI: 10.1086/262017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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