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Why charities announce donations: a positive perspective

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  • Romano, Richard
  • Yildirim, Huseyin

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  • Romano, Richard & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2001. "Why charities announce donations: a positive perspective," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 423-447, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:81:y:2001:i:3:p:423-447
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    8. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1986. "On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 789-793, September.
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