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Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

Author

Listed:
  • Dennis Epple
  • Richard Romano

Abstract

Some public goods are provided entirely with private contributions, others with a mixture of public and private funding, and still others are entirely publicly funded. In order to study this variation, a model of dual provision is developed that endogenizes public and private funding. Households vote over an income tax that finances public supply of the good and on whether to permit private contributions. While permitting private contributions may lead to a reduction in total provision, a majority always favors permitting private contributions. Results are developed for small and large economies, and the relevance of nonexcludability and noncongestion are investigated. Copyright 2003 By The Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Dennis Epple & Richard Romano, 2003. "Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(2), pages 545-572, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:44:y:2003:i:2:p:545-572
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    Cited by:

    1. Aleix Calveras & Juan-José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2011. "Voluntary contributions “vote out” public ones," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 283-303, September.
    2. Braid, Ralph M., 2010. "Provision of a pure local public good in a spatial model with many jurisdictions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 890-897, December.
    3. Bhattacharya, Sukanta & Saha, Sarani & Banerjee, Sarmila, 2016. "Income inequality and the quality of public services: A developing country perspective," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 1-17.
    4. de Janvry, A. & Dequiedt, V. & Sadoulet, E., 2014. "The demand for insurance against common shocks," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 227-238.
    5. Anesi, Vincent, 2008. "Incentives and prosocial behavior in democratic societies," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 849-855, December.
    6. Sita Nataraj Slavov, 2014. "Public Versus Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(2), pages 222-258, April.
    7. Rainald Borck, 2007. "Voting, Inequality And Redistribution," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 90-109, February.
    8. Christoph Luelfesmann, 2007. "Dual Provision of Public Policies in Democracy," Discussion Papers dp07-20, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    9. Lülfesmann, Christoph & Myers, Gordon M., 2011. "Two-tier public provision: Comparing public systems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1263-1271.
    10. Samwick, Andrew A. & Wang, Sophie, 2024. "Corporate social responsibility and voting over public goods," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    11. Andreas Lange & John A. List & Michael K. Price, 2007. "Using Lotteries To Finance Public Goods: Theory And Experimental Evidence," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 901-927, August.
    12. H. Shelton Brown III, 2005. "Nonprofit and For-Profit Competition with Public Alternatives in an Urban Setting with Congestion," International Regional Science Review, , vol. 28(3), pages 347-372, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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