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Provision of a pure local public good in a spatial model with many jurisdictions

  • Braid, Ralph M.
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    This paper examines the provision of a pure local public good in jurisdictions that are spaced evenly along an infinite line. Each jurisdiction either supplies the local public good, or else its residents travel to another jurisdiction to consume the local public good. The equilibrium spacing between jurisdictions which supply the local public good, which can be uneven (varying between a minimum spacing and a maximum spacing for given exogenous parameters), can be greater than, equal to, or less than the socially optimal spacing.

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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

    Volume (Year): 94 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 11-12 (December)
    Pages: 890-897

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:11-12:p:890-897
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    1. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
    2. Robin Boadway & Zhen Song & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2006. "Commitment and Matching Contributions to Public Goods," Working Papers 1067, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    3. Cremer, H. & Marchand, M. & Pestieau, P., 1991. "Investment in local public services : Nash equilibrium and social optimum," CORE Discussion Papers 1991038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Diamond, Peter, 2006. "Optimal tax treatment of private contributions for public goods with and without warm glow preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 897-919, May.
    5. Dennis Epple & Richard Romano, 2003. "Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(2), pages 545-572, 05.
    6. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2003. "Aggregative Public Goods Games," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000063,
    7. Roger H. Gordon, 1982. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," NBER Working Papers 1004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Braid, Ralph M., 2004. "Uneven spacing in free-entry equilibrium for spatial product differentiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 155-161, August.
    9. Braid, Ralph M., 2000. "A Spatial Model of Tax Competition with Multiple Tax Instruments," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 88-114, January.
    10. Vickrey, William S. & Anderson, Simon P. & Braid, Ralph M., 1999. "Spatial competition, monopolistic competition, and optimum product diversity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(7), pages 953-963, October.
    11. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    12. Robin Boadway & Pierre Pestieau & David Wildasin, 1987. "Tax-Transfer Policies and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers 682, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    13. B. Curtis Eaton & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1985. "Sophisticated Entry in a Model of Spatial Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(2), pages 282-297, Summer.
    14. Capozza, Dennis R & Van Order, Robert, 1980. "Unique Equilibria, Pure Profits, and Efficiency in Location Models," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 1046-53, December.
    15. Susana Peralta, 2007. "Political Support for Tax Decentralization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(6), pages 1013-1030, December.
    16. Stern, Nicholas, 1972. "The optimal size of market areas," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 154-173, April.
    17. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521477185 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Trandel, Gregory A., 1994. "Interstate commodity tax differentials and the distribution of residents," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 435-457, March.
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