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Matching as a Cure for Underprovision of Voluntary Public Good Supply: Analysis and an Example

  • Wolfgang Buchholz
  • Richard Cornes
  • Dirk Rübbelke

Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocations in a public good economy and to cure the underprovision problem associated with private provision of public goods. The desired Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium, however, emerges only under very special conditions. But we show in this note that corner solutions, in which some agents choose zero flat contributions, normally avoid underprovision and illustrate and interpret our results by a simple numerical example.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3374.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3374
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  1. Boadway,Robin & Pestieau,Pierre & Wildasin,David, 1986. "Tax-transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods," Discussion Paper Serie A 130, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
  3. Thomson, William, 1999. " Economies with Public Goods: An Elementary Geometric Exposition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 139-76.
  4. Josef Falkinger & Johann K. Brunner, 1999. "Taxation in an economy with private provision of public goods," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 357-379.
  5. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Cornes, Richard C, 1983. "Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1753-65, November.
  6. Guttman, Joel M, 1978. "Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 251-55, May.
  7. Varian, Hal R., 1994. "Sequential contributions to public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 165-186, February.
  8. Buchholz, Wolfgang & Cornes, Richard & Rübbelke, Dirk, 2011. "Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 639-645, August.
  9. Falkinger, Josef, 1996. "Efficient private provision of public goods by rewarding deviations from average," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 413-422, November.
  10. Georg KIRCHSTEIGER & Clemens PUPPE, 1996. "On the Possibility of Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods through Government Subsidies," Vienna Economics Papers vie9608, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  11. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2007. "Aggregative Public Good Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 201-219, 04.
  12. Schlesinger, Harris, 1989. "On the Analytics of Pure Public Good Provision," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 44(1), pages 102-09.
  13. Danziger, Leif & Schnytzer, Adi, 1991. "Implementing the Lindahl voluntary-exchange mechanism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 55-64, April.
  14. Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 2000. "Pareto-Improving Redistribution and Pure Public Goods," Staff General Research Papers 1833, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  15. Boadway, Robin & Song, Zhen & Tremblay, Jean-Francois, 2007. "Commitment and matching contributions to public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1664-1683, September.
  16. Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185.
  17. Althammer, Wilhelm & Buchholz, Wolfgang, 1993. "Lindahl-equilibria as the outcome of a non-cooperative game : A reconsideration," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 399-405, August.
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